Abstract. The connectivity of devices, machines and people via Cloud infrastructure can support collaborations among doctors and specialists from different medical organisations. Such collaborations may lead to data sharing and joint tasks and activities. Hence, the collaborating organisations are responsible for managing and protecting data they share. Therefore, they should define a set of access control policies regulating the exchange of data they own. However, existing Cloud services do not offer tools to analyse these policies. In this paper, we propose a Cloud Policy Verification Service (CPVS ) for the analysis and the verification of access control policies specified using XACML. The analysis process detects anomalies at two policy levels: a) intra-policy: detects discrepancies between rules within a single security policy (conflicting rules and redundancies), and b) interpolicies: detects anomalies between several security policies such as inconsistency and similarity. The verification process consists in verifying the completeness property which guarantees that each access request is either accepted or denied by the access control policy. In order to demonstrate the efficiency of our method, we also provide the time and space complexities. Finally, we present the implementation of our method and demonstrate how efficiently our approach can detect policy anomalies.
1. Introduction. The use of connected devices (mobiles, sensors, scanners etc.) permits the creation of Electronic Personal Records (EPR) to monitor patients' health states remotely. The EPR of a patient consists of medical histories, diagnoses, medications, immunization dates, etc [11] . A first advantage of an EPR is that it provides accurate, up-to-date, and complete information about patients. Another advantage is that it supports collaborations among different doctors in diverse medical organisations.
Cloud computing offers a suitable platform for such collaborations [1] . For instance, the storage service offered by the Cloud can be considered as a shared pool where medical organisations can store and share their data. A patient's EPR usually contains confidential data and hence each medical organisation needs to define a set of policies to regulate the access to the outsourced data. However, current Cloud solutions do not offer users the ability to define their own policies. To address this issue, we have developed, in previous work, a middleware (denoted curlX [6] ) that permits the enforcement of users' security policies in Openstack [27] (an open source Cloud solution). curlX uses XACML [25] (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) to specify access control policies [7] . Yet, XACML has many limitations in terms of policy anomaly detection [16] . For instance, XACML lacks a mechanism to detect conflicts and redundancies.
In this paper, we present a formal approach based on automata to detect anomalies in XACML policies such as: conflicting rules, redundancies, inconsistencies, and policy similarities; and to verify the completeness property that guarantees that each access request is either accepted or denied by the access control policy. The approach is implemented as a Cloud service denoted CPVS (Cloud Policy Verification Service) and integrated into curlX. The advantage of the proposed approach is that it detects several discrepancies in the XACML policies using the same formal model, in contrast to other existing approaches which make use of different models to detect distinct anomalies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents related work. In Section 3, we present an overview of XACML policies and automata. Section 4 describes the architecture of curlX taking into account the new verification service. In Section 5, we present the procedure to transform XACML policies into automata. Sections 6 and 7 define the approaches to detect anomalies and verify completeness in XACML policies. We calculate the time and space complexities in Section 8. Section 9 discusses the implementation and evaluation of our proposed approach. Finally, Section 10 concludes the paper and outlines areas for future research. 3 . Flexibility: It indicates whether a method can detect anomalies at run-time (i.e. detects if the new inserted rule raises anomalies with the existing rules prior to its enforcement). Table 2 .1 underlines our contributions compared to existing works. The proposed approach uses automata to represent the XACML policies. This formalism, allow us to detect several XACML anomalies (intra and inter policies conflicts) and to verify the completeness property using the same formal model. In addition, the approach has the ability to detect conflicting rules at run-time. In fact, the proposed approach models each security policy with an automaton. To verify if a new rule raises conflicts with the existing ones, the proposed approach consists in applying the synchronous product to the rule's automaton and the policy's automaton. The conflict detection process is then applied to the resulted automaton. Hence, there is no need to integrate the new rule into the policy to do the verification.
Preliminaries.
The proposed approach consists in verifying XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) security policies using automata. Therefore, in this section, we define the two concepts: automata and XACML.
3.1. Automata. Finite state automata (or briefly automata) are used, for example, for pattern matching in text editors [3] , for lexical analysis in compilers, for communication protocol specifications, for language recognition [9] , and for firewall design analysis [19] . An automaton can be formally defined by A = (Σ, Q, q 0 , Q f , δ) where Σ is a finite set of events (also called alphabet), Q is a finite set of states, q 0 is the initial state and Q f ⊆ Q is a finite set of final states. δ : Q × Σ → Q is the transition function, where δ(q, σ) = r means that the execution of the event σ (or the reading of the term σ) from state q leads to state r. δ(q, σ) = r can also be written as qσr.
An automaton A consists of states linked by labelled transitions, and represented by a graph whose nodes and arcs are the states and the transitions of A, respectively. There is one initial state (with a small incoming arrow) and one or more final states (double circled).
In this paper, we use the notation S = {σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ p } (it can be also denoted as S = {σ 1 }∪ {σ 2 }∪ . . . {σ p }) for a set of events. The notation qSr means that if q is the current state, then every event σ k from the set S leads to the state r. The arc labelled S, linking q and r, is equivalent to many arcs labelled σ 1 , . . . , σ p linking q and r.
A finite event sequence (more briefly, sequence) is accepted by A if it starts in the initial state q 0 and terminates in one of the final states of A. The language of A, denoted L A , is the set of sequences accepted by A.
The rich theory of automata allows us to compose models of systems, behaviours, mechanisms due to the operations that can be performed over automata. For instance, the synchronous products of two automata A 1 and A 2 over the alphabet Σ is an automaton over the alphabet Σ whose language is L A1 ∩L A2 . This intersection permits us to track the behaviour of the global system (consisting of the two subsystems modelled by A 1 and A 2 ) in order to detect anomalies and conflicts.
3.2. XACML. XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) has been widely used as a policy specification language in both academia and industry. Its first version was released by Anderson et al. [4] in 2003 and used in the context of distributed systems [21] . Two years later, OASIS extended the old version and proposed XACML 3.0 [25] . XACML assumes an architecture containing a PDP (Policy Decision Point), PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) and PAP (Policy Administration Point). The XACML request to access a specific resource is redirected to PEP. The PEP then extracts the attributes from the request and sends them to the PDP which searches in the policy repository for the appropriate policy that matches the request. The PDP then sends a response to the requester, which can be: Permit, Deny, Not Applicable or Indeterminate. The first two responses are obvious. Not Applicable is applied if no rule or policy matches the request. Indeterminate is applied if the system cannot interpret the request due to the lack of attributes or problems of connection. The PAP is responsible to associate the new added rules to the appropriate policy.
The main component of XACML Policy is composed of a Target that identifies the capabilities that should be exposed by the requester (the targeted resources for example), and some Rules. Each Rule contains facts (Subjects, Resources, Actions and Environment) for access control decisions and an Effect that can be either Permit or Deny.
Policies can be combined using PolicySet that specifies the combining algorithms in case if two security policies provoke permit/deny conflicts. XACML offers four combining algorithms:
• permit-override: If at least one policy is evaluated as "permit", the integrated output will also be "permit".
• deny-override: If at least one policy is evaluated as "deny", the integrated output will also be "deny".
• first applicable: The result of the combining algorithm is the result of the first policy that evaluates to Permit or Deny.
• only-one-applicable: The result is the one of the only applicable policy. If we have more than one policy, then the result is Not Applicable. A XACML policy contains hundreds and thousands of rules, which make it difficult to detect policy conflicts directly from the XML file. Yet, identifying conflicts in XACML policies is a primordial task for their designers. In fact, the choice of the combining algorithms relies essentially on the information from conflict diagnosis. The XACML policies may contain two kinds of conflicts: intra-policy (conflict between rules of the same policy) and inter-policy (conflict between rules of several policies defined under the PolicySet).
CPVS:
Cloud Policy Verification Service. Cloud computing offers several services, such as computing, authentication, and storage. These services could support collaborations among different organisations. Yet, such collaborations need to be regulated by a set of access control policies to protect the shared resources. However, the current Cloud architectures do not provide to the users the capability to define their own access control policies (high level control policies). For instance, Openstack is a widely used Cloud open source software that offers a storage service via Swift [5] . Although the Swift component supports fine-grained access control to objects (resources), it remains specific and at a low level of control. To address this issue, we have developed a middleware denoted curlX [6] that permits the collaborators to express their own security policies using XACML and enforce them using the cloud primitives such us curl (client url request) library. The user sends a curl request to the middleware asking for accessing a resource stored in Swift (see Fig. 4 .1). The curl request is of the form:
The authentication token and the storage url are provided by Keystone. Keystone is an authentication service in Openstack. It provides each authenticated user by tokens that expire after a specific time delay. The curl request is redirected to the translator component to be transformed into XACML request and redirected to the PEP. After retrieving the main attributes (subjects, resources, and action), PEP sends them to PDP in order to search for an adequate policy, and then decide if the request is permitted or not.
In the first version of curlX [7] , we did not take into account the analysis of XACML policies. For this purpose, in this paper, we integrate a new component into curlX denoted CPVS (Cloud Policy Verification Service). • Intra-policy anomaly detection: responsible for detecting conflicting and redundant rules in a single security policy. • Inter-policy anomaly detection: if the policy cache contains combined security policies, this module is used to detect inconsistency and similarity between the combined policies.
• flexibility: medical organisations may add a new rule to their security policies. However, this new rule may create a conflict with the existing ones. Hence, this module is responsible for verifying if the new rule generates any conflicts or redundancies prior to its enforcement.
• Policy properties verification: verifies the completeness for each policy stored in the cache. Each verification module communicates with the policy cache via the Xparser sub-module that parses the XACML policies and extracts its components in a hierarchical way.
5. Modelling XACML Policies by Automata. 5.1. Use Case: Stroke Accident. Healthcare organisations provide several services to their patients: emergency services, day procedures, diagnostic services, therapy services, etc. For each service, an organisation may have to produce documents (e.g. personal records, X-ray, brain scan, electroencephalography (EEG), etc). Those documents are typically stored in the organisation's data center. An organisation's data should be accessible by stakeholders from other organisations, so that they can collaborate in an elaborated diagnosis. However, information sharing must be regulated in order to guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of the shared information. This leads to the necessity of having policies regulating the medical data sharing.
Hereafter, we consider a reference scenario of a stroke accident presented by the Moroccan emergency medical service of Rabat [26] . In this scenario, three kinds of medical organisations are involved: two hospitals (H 1 and H 2 ), one emergency medical service (EMS) and two university hospitals (UH 1 and UH 2 ). These organisations are involved in a collaborative session (presented by a sequence of accesses) in order to perform an effective diagnosis to the transferred patient. In fact, doctors located in the host hospital (the hospital where the patient has been transferred) can make use of the experiences of specialists located in other medical organisations.
Our proposed scenario is that of a patient that has an accident and is transferred to the nearest hospital, which we call host hospital and denote by H 1 . The Moroccan medical system relies on distributed storage: the patient can have his medical file in another hospital H 2 . Once the patient is in H 1 , the generalist calls EMS and a regulator receives the call and inserts the patient's information in the system. The regulator looks for the available specialist doctors: radiologists, cardiologists, neurologists etc., in other hospitals or in university hospitals. Once he finds a list of available doctors, the regulator creates a collaborative session. During the collaborative session (whose aim is to elaborate a diagnosis), the specialist doctors may ask the host hospital to provide them with some scans and a part of the medical file of the patient.
Each organisation regulates the access to its own resources by enforcing a set of access control rules. For example, we consider the rule R 1 in a hospital H 1 that permits the radiologists of H 1 to write into the personal record (PR) and the scans of all the patients belonging to this hospital. In the rest of the paper, we adopt three essential notions that are used in the security policies: subjects, objects (resources), and actions. Therefore, in the next subsection we formally describe each one of them. This description is essential for the construction of automata.
Formal Description of the Collaborating Organisations.
Let Org denote the set of organisations involved in the collaborative session. Each organisation has:
• Subjects: they are human resources. Formally, we have: Subjects = Doctors ∪ Nurses where Doctors = ∪ x∈Org doctors x where doctors x = generalists x ∪ radiologists x ∪ regulators x ∪ cardiologists x ∪ neurologists x • Objects: they are physical and computer resources (hardware, software). For the sake of simplicity, we consider here only the following categories: personal records (PR), scans, audio, lists of available doctors (listDoctors x ), and the histories of the collaborative session's discussion (collSessDisc x ). We obtain formulas like: Objects = ∪ x∈Org objects x where
For the rest of the paper, we consider four types of scans: MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging), CAT (Computed Axial Tomography), EEG (Electroencephalography) and MRA (Magnetic Resonance Angiogram). For the purpose of illustrating our study, we will consider only the following three categories of medical organisations that are present in most scenarios: hospitals, university hospitals, and emergency medical services. For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict their sets of subjects and objects as follows ( Figure 5.1 subjects Hi = generalists Hi ∪ radiologists Hi ∪ nurses Hi The objects of a hospital are: personal records of patients regularly followed by the hospital, or of patients transferred to the hospital in emergency cases; and scans consisting of MRI, MRA, CAT, and EEG. Formally:
2. University hospitals UH 1 , UH 2 , UH 3 , . . . The subjects of a university hospital are specialist doctors (for our case, neurologists, cardiologists and radiologists). Formally: subjects UHi = neurologists UHi ∪ radiologists UHi ∪ cardiologists UHi .
3. Emergency medical services EMS 1 , EMS 2 ,. . . The subjects of an emergency medical service are regulators and generalists. Formally:
The objects of an emergency medical service are personal records of the hosted people and who passed through the emergency case, audio records, list of the doctors of hospitals and university hospitals, and history of the collaborative session's discussions. Formally:
5.3. From XACML Policies to Automata. XACML policies have three levels, namely PolicySet, Policy and Rule. Rule is the single entity that describes the particular access control policy. Therefore, in this paper, we focus mainly on the formalisation of Rule. Policy is the sequence (combination) of several rules. PolicySet is the sequence (combination) of two or more policies.
A rule is formally defined by triplet (S, O, a U ), where S is a set of subjects, O is a set of objects, and a U represents a permission. More precisely, in a U we have a = Deny or Permit, and U is a set of actions like read and write. The meaning of (S, O, a U ) is:
• if a=Permit, then any action in U applied by a subject of S to an object of O is permitted;
• if a=Deny, then any action in U applied by a subject of S to an object of O is forbidden.
The rule described at the end of Sect. 5.1 can be written as follows: (radiologist H1 , scans H1 ∪ P R H1 , p write ). This gives the right to the radiologists of hospital H 1 to perform the write action on the two categories of objects: the scans and personal records of all patients of hospital H 1 . In XACML, a rule is described by: an Effect and a Target. The Effect can have two values: "Permit" and "Deny". The Target is a combination of Match elements. Each Match element describes an attribute that a Request should match in order to activate a policy. There are four attribute categories in XACML 3.0, namely: (a) subject attribute is the entity requesting the access, e.g., generalist, radiologist, etc; (b) resource attribute is the object or the required data, e.g., EEG, MRA, etc; and (c) action attribute defines the type of access requested, e.g, read, write, delete, etc. The evaluation of the Match attributes extracted from the rule permits the evaluation of the request. Even if the request matches one of the rules, the algorithm continues until the last rule in the PolicySet.
Our proposed automata-based approach is realized as follows: From the XACML representation of a policy F, we construct an automaton A that models F, and then our analyses of F are done on A. The automaton A generated from a policy F has the following characteristics: from the initial state of A, we have several possible paths where each path consists of a pair of transitions that leads to a final state associated to a permission a U (see Sect. 3.1). Each path represents a rule (S, O, a U ) of F as follows: the first and second transitions are labelled S and O respectively, and the reached state is associated to a U . The set of paths of A represents therefore a set of rules that constitute F. Table 5 .1 indicates how the constituents of a XACML policy are represented in the corresponding automaton. Consider a medical organisation x and its security policy consisting of rules x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , where n is the number of rules. The construction of the automaton from the policy is done in four steps [19] :
• Step 1: Attribute extraction from a XACML policy. Algorithm 1 parses the XACML policy using the function getDetailPolicy that extracts rules from the XML file and expresses each one of them formally by a triplet (S, O, a U ). Each rule has: Effect (a), SubjectMatch (S), ResourceMatch (O), Action (U ). have the same alphabet, the objective here is therefore to rewrite the transitions of the automata so that they have the same alphabet (this rewriting is useful for Step 4). This is realized by partitioning each of the domains of subjects and objects into a set of disjoint sets. Such partitioning permits to express a transition of an automaton as a union of sets of the partition.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm of Step 1
Input: XACML Policy Output: S, O, a, U 1: procedure getDetailPolicy(Policy.xml) 2:
document ← parse(P olicy.xml)
3:
root ← document.getDocumentElement() ◃ parses the tags of the xml file
4:
while root ̸ = Endof Document do
5:
for i ← 0, nbRootN odes do
6:
if node.getN ame = "Rule" and node.getAttributes ̸ = null then
7:
a ← node.getAttributes.getN amedItem("Ef f ect")
8:
if node.getNodeName = "SubjectMatch" then
9:
S ← Attribute.getT extContent
10:
else if node.getNodeName = "ResourceMatch" then
11:
O ← Attribute.getT extContent
12:
else if node.getNodeName() = "ActionMatch" then 13: For example, the automaton of Fig. 5 .2 is transformed into the automaton of Fig. 5.3 . The set scans H1 has been partitioned into 4 sets MRI H1 , MRA H1 , CAT H1 and EEG H1 , which implies that the transition labelled scans H1 is replaced by four transitions labelled MRI H1 , MRA H1 , CAT H1 and EEG H1 , respectively. • Step 4: Product of automata. In order to model the security policy defined in a XACML policy file, we combine the automata resulting from Step 3 by an operator called synchronous product. Hereafter, we consider the policy presented in Table 5 .2 as an example. It contains seven rules regulating access to different resources (objects). The resulting automaton representing the policy of an organisation x is denoted A x . Each of its states is a combination of states (u 1 , u 2 ,. . . , u n ) of the various combined automata, hence each u i = x Table 5 .2, we obtain the automaton of Fig. 5.4 . Let us explain the notation used for match-states, for example the match-state h 2 1,5,7 associated to permissions (P read , D read , P read ). This state is reached by the pair of transitions (generalist, PR), i.e. when a generalist wants to have access to a personal record of a patient. The three indices 1, 5, and 7 mean that this access is matched by the rules 1, 5 and 7. The three permissions are respectively associated to the three indices, i.e.: R 1 and R 7 permit the read access, and R 5 forbids the read access. 6. Intra-and Inter-security Policy Anomaly Detection. In a XACML policy, we can specify the policies of several entities (or organisations, like hospitals): the policy of each organisation is represented by Policy. PolicySet specifies how the different Policy components are combined. We study therefore two types of anomalies: intra-policy anomalies that correspond to anomalies between rules of a same policy, and inter-policies anomalies that correspond to anomalies between rules of different policies. In this paper, we consider two types of intra-policy anomalies: redundancy and conflicting rules, and two types of inter-policy anomalies: similarity and inconsistency.
6.1. Intra-policy anomaly detection. Let us first consider intra-policy anomalies of a policy F and show how they are detected by the automaton of F.
6.1.1. Detecting redundant rules. In a policy F, a rule R j is redundant to a rule R i if the result of F is not changed by removing R j and keeping R i . Proposition 1. Consider a policy F and its automaton A F . A rule R j is redundant to a rule R i if for every match-state x Consider, for example, the policy of Table 5 .2 and its automaton of Fig. 5.4 . Rules 2 and 6 are mutually redundant to each other, because: 1) the indices 2 and 6 are in the state h 2 2,6 and there is no other state where the indices are not together, and 2) the same permission P read is associated to both indices. Therefore, we can remove either R 2 or R 6 without changing the result of the policy.
6.1.2. Detecting conflicting rules. In a policy F, two rules R i and R j are conflicting if they can match the same subjects and objects (s,o) and have different permissions.
Proposition 2. Consider a policy F and its automaton A F . Rules R i and R j are conflicting if there exists a match-state x 2 j1,j2... of A F such that: 1. the match-state has the indices i and j, and 2. i and j are associated to different permissions. Consider, for example, the policy of Table 5 .2 and its automaton of Fig. 5.4 . The match-state h 2 3,4 implies that R 3 and R 4 are conflicting. Intuitively, R 3 permits radiologists to read scans while R 4 forbids it. Also, the match-state h 2 1,5,7 implies that R 5 is conflicting with R 1 and R 7 . Intuitively, R 1 and R 7 permits generalists to read PR while R 5 forbids it.
Algorithm 2 in Appendix A regroups the steps of detecting intra-policy conflicts. The algorithm consists in extracting the final states using the function getFinalNodes. The algorithm compares then the permissions associated to each final state, if they are different, the rules are considered as conflicting rules, and otherwise they are redundant.
6.2. Inter-policy anomaly detection. Let us now consider inter-policy anomalies of two policies F 1 and F 2 . To detect this type of anomalies, we need here to construct an automaton that combines the automata A F 1 and A F 2 . This is equivalent to consider the global policy F obtained by putting together the rules of F 1 and F 2 and then constructing the automaton A F of F.
6.2.1. Detecting similar policies. Two policies F 1 and F 2 are similar if in every situation, the decision of F 1 is similar to the decision of F 2 .
Proposition 3. Consider two policies F 1 and F 2 and the automaton A F of the policy F that regroups F 1 and F 2 . F 1 and F 2 are similar if in F: every rule of F 1 is redundant to a rule of F 2 , and every rule of F 1 is redundant to a rule of F 2 .
Proposition 3 implies that similarity can be verified by detecting redundancy between the rules of the policies using Proposition 1.
Detecting inconsistent policies.
Two policies F 1 and F 2 are inconsistent if there exists a situation where they have contradictory (i.e., different) decisions.
Proposition 4. Consider two policies F 1 and F 2 and the automaton A F of the policy F that regroups F 1 and F 2 . F 1 and F 2 are inconsistent if in F: there exist a rule of F 1 and a rule of F 2 which are conflicting.
Proposition 4 implies that inconsistency can be verified by detecting conflicting rules using Proposition 2. Therefore, the same logic of the two procedures of Algorithm 2 can be applied to detect inconsistency and policy similarity. The only difference is the input of the algorithm: instead of an automaton corresponding to one policy, the input is replaced by a synthesized automaton of two policies (Algorithm 3 in Appendix A).
Verification of the Completeness Property.
Besides the intra-and inter-security policy anomalies, it is important to assure the evaluation of security properties to guarantee the correctness of access control policies. Most of the existing Cloud verification methods focus mainly on the system behaviour verification and do not take into consideration the security policies. Therefore, designing a dedicated tool that targets the verification of security properties in the Cloud is an important issue to be addressed [13] . In this section, we describe a formal method based on the automata generated in Section 5 to detect and verify the completeness property. Completeness guarantees that each access request is either accepted or denied by the access control policy.
Proposition 5. A security policy P is complete if and only if the corresponding synthesized automaton A P has no no-match state.
For instance, the security policy presented in Table 5 .2 is incomplete because its corresponding automaton in Fig. 5.4 has a no-match state denoted h # . The 3 paths leading to h # correspond to the following 3 situations:
• A radiologist requests access to a PR or EEG.
• A generalist requests access to a scan.
• A neurologist requests access to a PR or a scan that is not EEG. Intuitively, the security policy of Table 5 .2 does not take any decision in these 3 situations. Algorithm 4 in Appendix A presents the procedure isComplete that verifies if the input automaton has a no-match state.
Evaluation of Space and Time Complexities.
Let n be the number of rules of a policy, and d 1 and d 2 be the numbers of bits to code the subjects and objects, respectively. Hence, the maximum possible number of subjects and objects are 2 d1 and 2 d2 , respectively. Let
We consider two notions called great fields and small fields defined by Khoumsi et al. [19] . A great field is a field whose domain contains more than n values, and a small field is a field whose domain contains at most n values. We then consider two variables: µ, the number of great fields; and δ, the sum of the number of bits to code the small fields.
By adapting the results of Khoumsi et al. [19] to our context, we obtain Proposition 6 (the proof of this proposition is in Appendix B).
Proposition 6. The space and time complexities of automata construction and completeness detection are in O(n µ+1 × 2 δ ), which is bounded by both O(n 3 ) and O(n × 2 D ). The bounds of the complexities for the procedures of policy analysis are obtained by multiplying the above values by n. Hence, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 7. The space and time complexities of redundancy and conflict detections are in O(n µ+2 ×2 δ ), which is bounded by O(n 4 ) and O(n 2 × 2 D ). The latter result holds also for detecting similarity and inconsistency between two policies, but by replacing n by n 1 + n 2 , where n 1 and n 2 are the numbers of rules of the two policies.
As an example, we can consider a policy with n = 500 rules where the maximum number of subjects is 256 (so the subjects are coded in 8 bits: 2 8 = 256) and where the maximum number of objects is 131072 (hence the objects are coded in 17 bits: 2 17 = 131072). Hence: • D = 25 = 8+17 = total number of bits to code the great and small fields.
• µ = 1 = number of great fields: there is one great field which is "objects", because 2 17 >500.
• 2 − µ = 1 = number of small fields: there is one small field which is "subjects", because 2 8 ≤ 500. • δ = 8 = number of bits to code the small field subjects If we use the expression O(n µ+1 × 2 δ ) which depends on the great and small fields, we obtain: O(n µ+1 × 2 δ ) = O((500 2 ) × (2 8 )) = O(64 millions). However, if we use the two expressions O(n 2 ) and O(n × 2 D ) which do not depend on the great and small fields, we obtain:
From the example, we can conclude that by considering the great and small fields, we obtain a more precise estimation of the complexity. Note that:
• when all the fields are great, we obtain O(n µ+1 × 2 δ ) = O(n 2 ), • when all the fields are small, we obtain O(n µ+1 × 2 δ ) = O(n × 2 D ). From Proposition 6, the time and space complexities of automata construction and completeness detection are upper-bounded by O(n 3 ) and O(n × 2 D ). Let Ns and No be the maximum numbers of subjects and objects, respectively. We have 2
We deduce that our complexities of automata construction and completeness detection exceeds neither the order of the polynomial n 3 nor the order of n × Ns × No. With the same reasoning on Proposition 7 we obtain that our complexities of redundancy and conflict detections exceed neither the order of the polynomial n 4 nor the order of n 2 × Ns × No. In conclusion, our complexities are at most polynomial in n and linear in Ns and No.
9. Implementation and Evaluation. We have implemented our policy analysis service CPVS (Cloud Policy Verification Service) in Java. This service is integrated into curlX, a middleware integrated into Openstack. Based on our policy anomaly analysis mechanism, CPVS consists of four core components: Inter-policy anomaly detection module, intra-policy anomaly detection module, policy property verification module, and flexibility module. The modules are described in detail in Section 4. CPVS makes use of the DOM API provided by the Sun XACML implementation in order to parse the XACML policies and extract the attributes. We have implemented a Domain Specific Language (DSL) to support the construction of automata. In order to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed solution, first we need large policy data sets. Unfortunately, no one has been published due to confidentiality constraints. Hence, we have developed a random policy generator in order to generate a large number of XACML policies.
For scalability, it is also important to note that creating subjects and objects with no semantic relationship (categorisation) is an inefficient approach. It is better to regroup the subjects and objects in subsets or categories to reduce their sizes. For instance, we can have 10 objects: 4 files consisting of prescriptions and 3 scans (EEG, MRI , BrainScan), and 3 documents containing information about the patient. For this example, we have two sub-categories: Scans and PR (prescriptions and documents). In this way, instead of having 10 atomic objects, we have only 2 subsets. This reduces the number of states in the final policy automaton, which then reduces the time of anomaly detection.
We evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of CPVS for synthetic XACML policies using 10 synthetic generated policies. Our experiments were performed on an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 2.00 GHz with 3.00 GB RAM running on Windows 7. We adopted three types of performance measurement related to intra-policy anomaly detection, inter-policy anomaly detection and incompleteness detection.
The time required by CPVS to detect anomalies, such as redundancy and conflicts, depends on the time of parsing and comparing the final states of the automaton. From Fig. 9 .1, we can notice that the times of conflict and redundancy detections are quasi equal, which reflects the results of time complexity of Section 8.
Furthermore, we generated synthetic policies consisting of 100 rules, and we combined them using the synchronous product. Figure 9 .2 presents the performance of CPVS to detect inconsistency and similarity between different set of policies (2, 4 . . . 10).
The verification of completeness, which consists in finding the no-match state in the policy's automata, depends on the location of such a state. The performance of such verification is quasi constant (Fig. 9.3 ). It remains 2 ms for policies that contain 100, 200, 300 and 400 rules, and then it goes to 3 ms for the four other policies.
10. Conclusion. We have proposed a formal approach based on automata to detect XACML policy anomalies and verify the policy completeness. Our proposed approach consists of four steps: (1) extracting attributes from XACML policies; (2) modelling each rule by an automaton; (3) standardising the sets of transitions in automata; and finally (4) forming products of automata to model the security policy. The resulted automaton is used to detect anomalies based on analysing its final states. We evaluated the time and space complexities for anomaly detection. The approach has been implemented in a Cloud service called CPVS (Cloud Policy Verification Service) integrated into a middleware denoted curlX. The advantage of our approach is that it detects several anomalies in XACML policies at two different levels using the same formal model. In fact, it can detect intra-policy anomalies such as conflicts and redundancies, and inter-policy anomalies such as inconsistencies and similarities.
In future work, we intend to propose a formal approach to resolve the detected anomalies based on a dynamic aspect. The resolution takes into consideration the XACML combining algorithms. Moreover, the concept of delegation is often used in the domain of e-health, so we intend to verify the impact of delegation of roles on the security policies. 
